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TRIAL BY JURY AND SPEEDY JUSTICE*
J. EDWARD LUMBARDt
In almost every urban center of the United States court records and
the daily press remind us of the increasing delays in disposing of criminal
charges and the many months of waiting which civil litigants must endure
before their cases are reached for trial.
I propose to examine the extent to which trial by jury contributes to
our present predicament and to explore the means whereby we can reduce
the time required to try jury cases, within constitutional and statutory
limits.
The courtroom is the bottleneck which determines the rate at which
cases are tried and in large degree the speed with which they are settled.
The time it takes to dispose of cases depends largely on how soon a judge
will be available to hear them. The great majority of cases, both civil and
criminal, will be settled, but most of these settlements will not take place
until the eve of trial. In civil cases, only about 10% actually go to
trial-somewhat more than 10% for accident claims and somewhat less
than 10% for commercial disputes.'
The great majority of serious criminal cases are disposed of by pleas of
guilty-at least 80% in most jurisdictions and over 90% in many.2 But
during the past few years the federal courts and most state courts in urban
centers have experienced a noticeable decline in the percentage of pleas of
guilty and a corresponding increase in the cases that must be tried.
3
On the criminal side, comparing 1970 with 1960, not only were more
cases commenced and disposed of in the federal courts in 1970, but a
much larger number of cases were tried, and it took considerably longer to
try each case.4 This federal court experience has been duplicated in the
state courts, especially in the larger metropolitan centers. In the last 10
years the number of federal criminal trials climbed from 3,510 to 6,583,
*The John Randolph Tucker Lecture, delivered at Washington and Lee University on.
May 8, 1971.
tChief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. A.B. 1922, LL.B. 1925,
Harvard University.
'See, e.g., Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts [hereinafter cited as ARAOUSC], 1969, Table C4 (e.g., 72,461 civil cases
terminated; 7,843 civil trials held).
'See, e.g., Judicial Conference of the State of New York, Sixteenth Annual Report, for
the Judicial Year 1969-1970, Table 30, A 96 (1971) (Supreme Court and County Court:
convicted by plea, 19,862; total defendants disposed of, 23,941).
'See, e.g., ARAOUSC, 1960 and 1970, Table D-4. See also note 7 infra and
accompanying text.
'ARAOUSC, 1960 and 1970, Tables C-7 and C-8.
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an increase of 87%.5 During those years federal civil trials increased only
45%.
6
Whereas in 1960 pleas of guilty disposed of over 86% of the federal
criminal cases where guilt or innocence was determined, by 1970 the
percentage disposed of by guilty plea dropped to 80%.7 While the
percentage drop might seem small, it means about a 50% increase in the
-proportions of trials at a time when total volume is increasing. The
principal reasons for this decrease in pleas and the corresponding increase
in trials are, first, that counsel are now assigned and paid for by the
government whenever defendants are financially unable to retain counsel,"
and second, that court decisions have added to the rights and safeguards
for defendants in such a way that counsel more frequently decide that the
best protection is a trial and a record for the appellate courts. An appeal
presents no difficulty for the defense as the costs are also paid for. In the
federal courts the appeals from conviction after trial have more than
quadrupled in the last ten years.9
Not only are there many more criminal trials, but each contested
criminal case takes much more of the court's time, before trial and during
trial. 10 Before the jury is called, the court may be asked to hear and
determine claims of illegal search and seizure, illegally obtained
confession, improper identification procedures and incompetence to stand
trial. Even in cases where defendants eventually plead guilty, the court
may be required to spend considerable time taking evidence on one or
more of these preliminary questions.
As our courts give preference to criminal business because of the great
public interest in prompt disposition of criminal charges, there are fewer
judges available to try civil cases, with the result that delays in reaching
civil cases for trial are becoming longer and longer.
Merely increasing the number of judges and building more court
houses will not be accepted as a solution to court congestion until it is
clear that changes in methods and administration cannot meet the
situation. Consequently, we must first examine the many proposals to
change or modify our jury system in order to determine whether the
proposals are feasible and the extent to which their adoption would relieve
the congested conditions. These proposals include such far-reaching
changes as the abolition of the jury in all civil cases, the reduction of the
11d., Table C-7.
61d.
7ARAOUSC, 1960 and 1970, Table D-4. These percentages were computed by figuring
the proportion of guilty pleas to the total of all criminal cases disposed of by guilty plea or by
acquittal or conviction, either by a judge or a jury.
'18 U.S.C. § 3006A (Supp. V 1969).
'ARAOUSC, 1960, Table B-I, and 1970, Table B-7.
"ARAOUSC, 1960 and 1970, Table C-8.
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number of jurors in serious criminal cases and the acceptance of less than
unanimous verdicts.
Most Americans have an emotional reaction against the idea of
abolishing or curtailing the use of juries. The drama of the courtroom
would be a sorry thing without a jury of twelve unpredictable characters.
If a trial were to end with the judge merely saying "decision reserved" it
would be an awful comedown from the suspense of waiting for the jury to
agree and the excitement of the jurors filing in and, finally, the foreman's
announcement of the verdict.
My own reaction is the result of experience before juries in state and
federal courts; in criminal cases, as prosecutor, defense counsel, and as a
federal court trial judge; in civil cases, as plaintiff's and defendant's
counsel and as a trial judge in both state and federal courts. I have found
that jurors have very high standards of performance. They understand the
importance of their function; they give careful attention and spare no
effort to carry out their duties. If a jury goes wrong, by bringing in a
verdict not justified by the evidence, it is my experience that it usually
results from the judge's lack of firmness and leadership or the ambiguity
and lack of clarity of his instructions. One of our most revered and expert
trial judges in New York for over forty years was John Knox. I doubt that
a jury ever went wrong with Judge Knox presiding. He never told the jury
what to do but he was a man of such obvious fairness, warmth and
common sense that he established the kind of empathy with the jury which
somehow made the right result easy for them to reach. All our great trial
judges have those qualities in some degree. With such judges presiding it
matters not whether they have the right to comment to the jury.
On issues of fact I prefer the verdict of a jury to the single judgment of
one judge. I know of no reason why a group of laymen are not equally
capable of determining where the truth lies. Sifted through a group, any
biases or prejudices tend to cancel out, a process which obviously cannot
take place with a judge. Moreover, in a criminal case the jury has the
power to acquit if it feels that the case should not have been prosecuted or
that the government has acted oppressively. Used as it was in prohibition
days, this power of the jury can effectively nullify the enforcement of a law
which lacks public support.
The high regard of the average American for the jury system-a
regard which I share-arises largely from our history and the events which
led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights. Reaching full flower in England
before the Revolution, jury trial was regarded in the colonies as a vital
protection against the King's officers and his judges. The Declaration of
Independence listed as one of the complaints against royal tyranny that
the King had deprived the people "in many cases, of the benefits of Trial
by Jury." With independence won, the ratification of the Constitution
was in doubt because many rights of the citizens against a federal
1971]
312 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
government had not been explicitly stated, and, in order to carry the day,
the Constitution's supporters had to promise immediate attention to a Bill
of Rights, including the right to trial by jury." Madison's draft of the
proposed amendments was borrowed largely from Virginia's bill of
rights.' 2 Although article III of the Constitution had provided that the
trial of crimes was to be by jury, and that such trial must be held in the
state where the said crimes shall have been committed, 3 the sixth
amendment added the further protection that "the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." And for civil
cases, the seventh amendment provided:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.
In each of the former colonies 4 and in each state as it joined the union,
the state constitutions contained similar provisions regarding the right to
trial by jury, usually in language which followed closely that of the sixth
and seventh amendments.
5
Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution written in
1833, refers to jury trial in civil cases as "a privilege scarcely inferior to
"Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93-94 (1970); E. CORWIN & J. PELTASON,
UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 116-17 (3d ed. 1964); C. BEARD & M. BEARD, BASIC
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 137 (New Home Library ed. 1944).
"2Section 8 of the Virginia Bill of Rights provided:
That in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to . . . a
speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his vicinage, without
whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty;. . . that no man be
deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his
peers.
Section I I read:
That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man
and man, the ancient trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to
be held sacred.
ABA STANDING COMM. ON AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, No. I1, at
I I (R. Perry ed. 1959).
'
3U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2 provides:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury;
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have
been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall
be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by law have directed.
"Connecticut is an exception.
"5Section 8 of the Virginia Bill of Rights, note 12 supra, is a good example of such
language.
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that in criminal cases, which is counted by all persons to be essential to
political and civil liberty."
16
Democracy in America, written by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835, after
a visit throughout most of the United States in 1831, is generally
considered to be the most accurate and objective account of our political
system in Jacksonian days. De Tocqueville pointed out the importance of
trial by jury in the development and conduct of public affairs in words
which are often quoted: He wrote that the jury
places the real direction of society in the hands of the governed, or
of a portion of the governed, and not in that of the government.
The jury system as it is understood in America appears to me to be
as direct and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the
people as universal suffrage.
The jury is pre-eminently a political institution; it should be
regarded as one form of the sovereignty of the people:
The jury contributes powerfully to form the judgment and to
increase the natural intelligence of a people; and this, in my
opinion, is its greatest advantage.
I think that the practical intelligence and political good sense of the
Americans are mainly attributable to the long use that they have
made of the jury in civil causes.
Thus the jury, which is the most energetic means of making the
people rule, is also the most efficacious means of teaching it how to
rule well. 7
In our own day, the American Bar Association has expressed similar
views. In publishing its standards of judicial administration which were
formulated under the leadership of Arthur Vanderbilt of New Jersey and
Chief Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit, it emphasized language in the
1938 report of the ABA Committee on Trial by Jury, which said:
Jury service today is the chief remaining governmental function in
which lay citizens take a direct and active part, and trial by jury is
the best means within our knowledge of keeping the administration
of justice in tune with the community.18




DE ToCQUEVILLE, supra note 16, at 293-97.
"AMINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION xxxi (A. Vanderbilt ed. 1949).
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As the jury system developed in most of the newer states the dominant
tendency was to limit the power of the judge and to increase the power of
the jury even to the point where they decided matters of law as well as of
fact. But difficulties in procuring enough jurors in the rural communities
led to reduction in the number of jurors required in certain courts and
kinds of cases. By the 1920s many of the states had provided that, where
civil juries failed to agree upon a unanimous verdict within a certain time,
the court could receive a verdict by ten out of twelve or even nine out of
twelve. 19
By constitutional change, statute or court rule, every state has made
some modification of its jury system in deference to changing needs and
ideas. A summary of present day requirements in criminal cases illustrates
the great diversity in the federal and state systems.
Federal jury trial requirements in criminal cases are relatively simple:
Rule 31 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that in all
district court trials for serious crimes there be a jury of twelve whose
verdict must be unanimous. But Rule 23 permits the defendant to waive
jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the
government. In addition, under Rule 23, the defendant and the
government may stipulate in writing with the approval of the court that
the jury consist of any number less than twelve.
Under recent federal legislation authorizing the district courts to
appoint United States magistrates, 20 the district court may designate a
magistrate to try persons charged with minor offenses, 2' upon the written
consent of such persons, after the magistrate has advised them of their
right to be tried before a judge and that they may have the right to trial by
jury.
Most states require a jury of twelve in the trial of all serious crimes,
other than capital offenses, for which imprisonment is more than one
year, unless the defendant consents to a trial by less than twelve-as in
Connecticut where the choice is between twelve and siX. 22 In only five
states is it provided that trial of such crimes shall be by less than twelve
jurors: South Carolina, Texas, Louisiana, Florida and Utah. z? In the last
"A. HOLCOMBE, STATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1916).
2128 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. V 1969). Magistrates are appointed for terms of eight years,
and part-time magistrates for four years. 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (Supp. V 1969).
21A minor offense is a misdemeanor the punishment for which does not exceed
imprisonment for one year, or a fine of not more than S1,000 or both. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(f)
(Supp. V 1969).
'Phillips, A Jury of Six in All Cases, 30 CONN. B.J. 354 (1956); ABA PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRIAL BY JURY § 1.1 (c), at 24-25 (approved
draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA JURY STANDARDS].
21FLA. STAT. § 913.10(1) (1967); LA. CONsT. art. 7, § 41, implemented by LA. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. art. 779 (Supp. 1969); S.C. CONST. art. 1, §§ 18, 25, implemented by
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three of these, the jury is set at six.2" Many states allow trial by juries of six
if the defendant consents., At least eight states provide less than twelve-
man juries for the trial of misdemeanors where the maximum penalty does
not exceed one year.2 6 In Virginia there is no jury in such cases tried in
courts not of record, but a de novo trial may be had in the circuit court in
which case there is a five-member juryY For misdemeanors or petty
offenses punishable by not more than six months, several states provide
that such cases are to be tried without a jury before a judge, in some
instances, as in Virginia, subject to trial de novo before a jury. 2
Until the Supreme Court last June decided Baldwin v. New York,
29
New York State provided in the New York City Criminal Court Act that
trial of offenses punishable up to one year was to be without a jury.30 In
Baldwin the Court held that in the trial of any offense for which the
authorized punishment exceeds six months the defendant must be afforded
the opportunity of a jury trial.
In Williams v. Florida,31 decided last June, the Supreme Court held
that Florida could try a defendant before a six-man jury where the
maximum sentence was life imprisonment. This was held to be in accord
with the due process required of the states by the fourteenth amendment.
The majority reached this result, despite their holding that the sixth
amendment provisions for jury trial were incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment, by finding that a twelve man jury was not an essential
ingredient of sixth amendment trial by jury. Mr. Justice White stated the
reasons why a jury does not require twelve members .3 He wrote that the
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-618, 15-612 (1962); TEx. CONST. art. 1, §§ 10,15, implemented by
TEX. CODE CRINM. PROC. arts. 4.07, 37.02 (1966), TEX. PEN. CODE art. 1148 (Supp. 1960);
UTAH CONST. art I, §§ 10, 12, implemented by UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-46-5 (1953). See
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 99 n. 45 (1970).
2
1FLA. STAT. § 913.10(l) (1967); LA. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 779 (Supp. 1969);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-5 (1953).
2*ABA JURY STANDARDS § 1.3(a), at4l.
"See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 99 n.5 (1970); Id. at 139-41 (Appendix C to
opinion of Harlan, J.). See also ABA JURY STANDARDS § 1.1(c) at 24-25.
2VA. CONST. art. 1, § 8; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-123, 16.1-124, 16.1-126, 16.1-129,
16.1-132, 16.1-136, 18.1-6, 19.1-206 (Repl. Vol. 1960); § 18.1-9 (Supp. 1968).
2'Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 141-43 (1970) (appendix to concurring opinion of
Harlan, J.); ABA JURY STANDARDS § 1.1(a), (b), at 19-24.
-399 U.S. 66 (1970).
wIThis act provided for trial in such cases before a single judge. However, a defendant
charged with a misdemeanor is given the right to demand a trial before three judges. In
misdemeanor cases, the district attorney or the court could also demand a three-judge trial.
N.Y.C. CRIM. CT. AcT § 40 (McKinney Supp. 1970). In courts outside of New York City,
persons accused of crime may demand a jury of six. N.Y. UNIFORM DiST. CT. ACT § 2011
(McKinney 1963); N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. AT § 2011 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
31399 U.S. 78 (1970).
321d. at 86-103.
19711
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essential feature of jury trial in criminal cases is that the common sense
judgment of a group of laymen is interposed between the accused and his
accuser. He pointed out that one of the values of jury trial was the
community participation and shared responsibility that results from the
determination of guilt or innocence by such a group. He stated that there
is no virtue in a particular number although the number of jurors should
be large enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts
at intimidation and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a
representative cross-section of the community. He concluded that there is
little reason to think that the goals of jury trial are in any meaningful
sense less likely to be achieved when the jury numbers six, than when it
numbers twelve-and he added "particularly if the requirement of
unanimity is retained."'
With respect to the question of unanimity, only two states clearly
permit less than a unanimous verdict in trials for serious crimes:
Louisiana, which takes a verdict from nine of twelve jurors where the
punishment must be hard labor," and Oregon, which accepts a verdict
from ten of twelve jurors except in first degree murder cases.3s5 The
constitutionality of such provisions, however, is unclear. In Williams, the
Court specifically stated in a footnote that it intimated no view on whether
unanimity is required by the sixth amendment." This Term, the Court has
heard argument on the constitutionality of a nine-three verdict from
Louisiana and a ten-two verdict from Oregon in major criminal cases;"
but as yet it has not rendered its decision.
For offenses below the grade of felony, Montana allows a two-thirds
verdict;3 1 Oklahoma and Texas allow three-fourths; 3 and Idaho allows
five-sixths.4" There has as yet been no constitutional challenge to these
provisions.
In summary, it is now settled by Williams v. Florida that there is no
constitutional impediment to the trial of serious crimes, other than capital
crimes, by juries of less than twelve. Six-man juries are permitted, perhaps
even five-man juries. As for less than unanimous verdicts, it would seem
that while there is a good case for allowing such verdicts in civil cases, I
doubt the wisdom of doing so in criminal cases, except perhaps for lesser
3Id. at 100.
ULA. CONST. art. 7, § 41; LA. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 782 (West 1967).
Oaa. CONST. art. 1, § 11; ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 136.330, 136.610 (1967).
3399 U.S. at 100 n. 46.
3Johnson v. Louisiana, No. 5161, prob. juris. noted, 400 U.S. 900 (1970); Apodaca v.
Oregon, No. 5338, cert. granted, 400 U.S. 901 (1970).
38MoNr. CONST. art. 3, § 23.
3'OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 19, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 958.3, 958.6 (Supp. 1969-
70), tit. 21, § 10 (1958); TEx. CONST. art. 5, § 13.
"IDAHO CONsT. art. 1, § 7.
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crimes where maximum authorized punishment does not exceed one
year. " Requiring unanimity in serious criminal cases means careful
consideration of the views of every juror and thus constitutes some
insurance that the jury will not convict unless it is satisfied of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. In such cases, the public support and respect for the
jury system, which represents the ad hoe judgment of untrained laymen,
may be due in large part to the fact that all the jurors agree.42 We should
shortly learn whether the Supreme Court agrees.
Just a few weeks ago, on April 16, 1971, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, in light of Williams v. Florida, and acting upon a report by
committees of the bench and bar, called upon the Governor and the state
legislature to amend the New Jersey constitution to authorize the trial of
criminal cases by a jury of six.
1
There are other ways in which the length of time now required to
dispose of criminal trials can be considerably curtailed. At the head of the
list I would put empowering the trial judge to supervise and conduct the
examination of the jurors regarding their qualifications to sit in the case,
which we call the voir dire. Once counsel are permitted directly to question
the jurors themselves, the examination is extended beyond the necessities
and is made an occasion for stressing arguments and facts thought to be
helpful to the parties. It is enough that counsel be permitted to suggest
questions to the judge. All that the state and the defendant are entitled to
is an impartial and qualified jury, not a favorable one. Recently in New
York City at the joint trial of thirteen defendants, it took nineteen court
days to examine 241 jurors before the trial began.44 In the Bobby Seale
case now being tried in New Haven, it took three months to select a jury
and two alternates. This consumed fifty-one court days during which
more than 1,550 veniremen were called and 1,037 questioned.45 Once a
juror was chosen he waited in a room down the hall, day after day, with
the result that two jurors already selected took sick and had to be
replaced. To be sure, because of the publicity regarding both cases, it was
of utmost importance that some time be taken carefully to select impartial
jurors; but in each case the time spent was out of all proportion to what
was really needed. Such extended examination by counsel wastes valuable
time of the court, it incurs great expense, it inconveniences hundreds of
jurors and it must inevitably result in many good jurors responding to
"But see ABA JURY STANDARDS § 1.1(d), at 25-28.
"2See Holtzoff, Modern Trends in Trial by Jury, 16 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 27 (1959).
"2Memorandum of Edward B. McConnell, Administrative Director, Administrative
Office of the Courts, Trenton, N.J. I (released Apr. 16, 1971).
"Telephone conversation with law clerk to the Hon. John N. Murtagh, Justice of the
Supreme Court, First Judicial District of the State of New York, April 20, 1971.
"N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1971, at43, col. 2.
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questions in such a way that they will escape service. An unfortunate
consequence of such marathon jury selection is that the public and many
prospective jurors entertain a very low opinion of how the courts manage
their business. The standards recently adopted by the American Bar
Association for trial by jury in criminal cases provide that the judge
should initiate and conduct the voir dire examination, also permitting
such additional questions by the defendant and prosecutor as he deems
reasonable and proper." This system is permissible in the federal courts4"
where it seldom takes more than one day to select a jury.
Of course the greatest saving of court time comes from waiver of a
jury by the defendant. No defendant ever waives a jury until just before
trial is about to commence and he knows the judge who will preside. In the
federal courts Rule 23 provides that the defendant must execute a written
waiver, to which the government must consent and which the court must
approve.' s While only rarely does the government withhold its consent or
the judge his approval, the provision is useful. Because of the issues
involved, the government may prefer a decision by a jury. In addition,
there are cases where the judge withholds approval because he feels that
the responsibility of fact finding and final judgment should be borne by a
group representative of the community rather than by himself.
Waiver of jury has become fairly common in federal criminal trials.
During 1970 defendants waived juries in 37% of cases tried.49 This increase
from 28% in 196011 is accounted for primarily by the large number of 1970




I had hoped to be able to make some comparisons between use of
juries in federal and state criminal trials, but the available figures are not
sufficiently defined.
Tentatively, the figures seem to indicate that a higher percentage of
state trials of serious crimes are tried to a jury than is the case in the
federal courts. That is true in New York County and in the states of New
Jersey, Florida and Michigan, the latest figures being 94%, 86%, 77% and
66%5 respectively, compared to 63% for federal courts in 1970. What is
"ABA JURY STANDARDS § 2.4 at 2, 63-67.
"
7 FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 24(a).
4 FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 23(a).
"ARAOUSC, 1970, Table C-7 (4,226 criminal jury trials; 2,357 criminal nonjury
trials).
50ARAOUSC, 1960, Table C-7 (2,502 jury trials; 1,008 nonjury trials).
51ARAOUSC, 1970, Table C-8 (207 jury trials; 597 nonjury trials).
52N.Y. County statistics from telephone interview with office of Frank Hogan, District
Attorney for New York County, April 26, 1971 (249 jury trials, sixteen nonjury trials);
Report of the Administrative Director of the Courts, State of New Jersey, for the Court
Year 1969-70, Table D-8 (2,530 jury dispositions, 277 nonjury dispositions); Sixteenth
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perhaps of greater significance is that the trend in the past few years in
New Jersey, Florida, Illinois and Michigan is toward a higher percentage
of trials by jury. Thus, in New Jersey criminal trials, the percentage of
jury trials has increased in the ten years from 1959-60 to 1969-60 from
72% to 86%.5 In Florida the statewide percentage of jury trials rose from
39% in 1959 to 77% in 1970.1 From available statistics, then, it is clear
that the great majority of trials for serious crime, both in state and federal
courts are to a jury. Thus the increased time and expense involved in
criminal jury trial is a major factor in slowing the disposition of criminal
cases throughout the United States.
If the case is to be tried to a jury, court time is saved by any means
which assists the jury to understand better the evidence as it goes in and
thus to be able to reach a verdict without undue delay. I see no good
reason why the jurors should not take notes if they wish to do so. - In
many cases it is helpful to see that counsel provides sufficient copies of
important exhibits so that each juror has his own copy when the trial is
focusing on the particular exhibits. Counsel should be instructed to have
exhibits marked by the clerk before or after jury sessions as it is
unnecessary to have court and jury present for such bookkeeping. In
complicated cases the jury is usually assisted by being required to bring in
special verdicts, for example where there must be a finding that acts were
done within a statutory period.
In a lengthy trial it is of greatest importance for the judge to do
whatever is reasonable to prevent a hung jury which would mean a lengthy
retrial. The court should be empowered to have as many alternate jurors
selected as seems advisable. The federal rules now permit six alternates in
a criminal trial.5 1 In my opinion, the judge should also be empowered to
keep one or two alternates in attendance during the jury deliberations, to
replace any juror who may become incapacitated.
When the jury reports that it is unable to reach a verdict, the judge
Annual Report, Judiial Council of Florida, 1971 (covering calendar year 1970), Schedule C
(1,052 jury trials, 318 nonjury trials); Annual Report, Supreme Court of Michigan, Judicial
Statistics for 1969 (1,144 jury trials, 599 nonjury trials).
"New Jersey Reports, supra note 52, 1959-60 and 1969-70, Tables D-8 (1959-60-1,138
jury dispositions, 439 non-jury dispositions).
"Florida Annual Reports, supra note 52, 1960 and 1971, Schedule C (1959-149 jury
trials, 234 nonjury trials). Similarly in Illinois, the percentage of jury trials rose from 24% in
1961 (416 jury dispositions, 1294 nonjury dispositions) to 40% in 1968 (595 jury dispositions,
902 nonjury dispositions). Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts, 1961 and 1968
Annual Reports to the Supreme Court of Illinois. In Michigan, the percentage of jury trials
rose from 60% in 1964 to 66% in 1969. Michigan Annual Reports, supra note 52, for 1964
and 1969.
'See ABA JURY STANDARDS § 4.2 at 97-100.
"FED. R. CRIM. PROc 24(c).
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should be permitted to give an additional instruction pointing out the
desirability of reaching a verdict and suggesting to the minority that they
should give weight to the fact that a majority of their colleagues take a
different view, so long as they do not surrender their honest convictions
solely for that reason.5 7 Requiring unanimity in criminal cases has certain
values referred to above, but once sufficient time has passed to ensure a
full discussion, I submit the paramount objective then becomes to avoid a
hung jury, which is the result in something over 5% of criminal jury
trials. 5
As we have seen, the jurors themselves are frequently put on trial in
criminal cases of public interest. In some cases this process has been
continued after trial by questioning the jurors and asking them to make
public statements. In my opinion, no court or judge should permit any
questioning of jurors after the trial, except in those rare instances where
counsel present to the court some good reason to believe that there has
been criminal or grossly improper conduct which may have tainted the
verdict. Jurors should be free to express their views freely and completely,
whatever those views may be short of constituting criminal conduct such
as bribery, coercion, or assault. The jury system can work satisfactorily
only if jurors know and are assured that what they say in the jury room is
confidential and not subject to exposure by any juror, except as the court
may order for good reason. Accordingly, I recommend that by statute or
court rule, trial judges should be required to instruct juries that they are
under a duty to keep secret everything that happens in their deliberations,
and to instruct counsel not to question jurors without court order, and
that failure to observe these instructions will be treated as contempt of
court.
In civil cases in the federal courts, Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, after restating the seventh amendment right to trial by
jury, requires that a party having a right to jury trial must serve a demand
for jury trial within ten days after pleadings have been served which are
directed to a jury issue. Failure to serve such demand constitutes waiver of
the right to trial by jury.
There has been a considerable decline in the use of juries in federal civil
cases due to several factors. First, much present day litigation,
particularly that arising out of business transactions, presents
complicated questions which are viewed by both parties as unsuitable for
jury decision. Second, much litigation regarding rights newly created by
statute are of an equitable nature and are not suits at common law.59 Most
5 See ABA JuRY STANDARDS § 5.4(a) at 145-47. See also the concurring opinion of
Lumbard, C.J., in Grace Lines, Inc. v. Mottley, No. 35,581 (2d Cir. Mar. 1, 1971).
uH. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 453 (1966).
5See 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.11 [7], at 122-25 (2d ed. 1969).
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of the current civil rights litigation is in this category. Other cases are
exempt from the jury guarantees either by express language of the statute
or by judicial construction. 0 A third factor is the desire to avoid the
greater expense of a jury trial which, on the average, takes twice as long as
trial before a judge.6
On the other hand Congress has from time to time made express
provision that claims be tried by a jury. Thus, suits brought by seamen
against shipowners would not have been jury cases under the common
law, but by the Jones Act of 1920 they are tried to a jury.
62
In the federal courts in 1970, only 36% of civil cases were tried to a
jury.63 This represents a decrease in trials to a jury from 47% in 1960.4 The
difference is largely accounted for by the great increase in civil rights cases
and state prisoner habeas corpus hearings which ordinarily are tried to a
judge.6 5 In addition, most commercial cases are tried without a jury. But
in all types of accident cases there is still a decided preference for trial by
jury-70%.66
As the bulk of state court civil business consists of accident cases, it is
to be expected that a majority of civil trials are to a jury. From the latest
reports available, New York has 56% jury trials, New Jersey 68%, Illinois
78% and Massachusetts 81%.67 In these states, the percentages of jury
trials are even higher for automobile negligence and personal injury
cases.6" Massachusetts and New Jersey showed a definite trend over the
wrhe Federal Tort Claims Act, for example, specifically provides for trial without jury.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402, 2471-2480 (1964).
"See B. BOTEIN & M. GORDON, THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE: CHALLENGE TO THE LAW
106 (1963). Moreover, the time from filing to trial in civil jury cases is much greater than in
nonjury cases. For example,'in Michigan in 1969, the average number of months from filing
to trial in automobile negligence cases was 30.5 months for jury cases and 17.2 months for
nonjury cases; in other civil cases the average was 27.6 months for jury cases and 12.2
months for nonjury cases. Michigan Annual Report, 1969, supra note 52.
£246 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). See generally 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE: 38.35 [4],
at 278-85 (2d ed. 1969).
-ARAOUSC, 1970, Table C-7 (3,371 civil jury trials, 6,078 civil nonjury trials).
-ARAOUSC, 1960, Table C-7 (3,035 jury trials, 3,453 nonjury trials).
"ARAOUSC, 1960 and 1970, Tables C-8 (1960-33 habeas corpus hearings and fifty-
one civil rights trials; 1970-576 habeas corpus hearings and 921 civil rights trials).
"ARAOUSC, 1970, Table C-8. In motor vehicle personal injury cases, for instance,
there were 1,219 jury trials and 332 nonjury trials in 1970. Id.
"New York Annual Report, supra note 2, 1969-1970, Table 9 (43,891 jury dispositions,
34,097 nonjury dispositions); New Jersey Report, 1969-70, supra note 52, Table D-3 (2,453
jury dispositions, 1,123 nonjury dispositions); Illinois Annual Report, 1968, supra note 54
(23,800 jury dispositions, 6,700 nonjury dispositions); Thirteenth Annual Report to the
Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1968-69 (1,794 jury trials, 421
nonjury trials).
" ln New Jersey, for example, the percentage of jury trials in automobile negligence
cases in 1969-70 was 87% (1,746 jury dispositions, 236 nonjury dispositions). New Jersey
Report, 1969-70, supra note 52, Table D-3. In Michigan, the percentage ofjury trials in such
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past ten years toward a higher percentage of trials by jury,-from 72% to
81% in Massachusetts," and from 58% to 68% in New Jersey.70 On the
other hand, New York's percentage declined from 68% to 56% in those ten
years, 7' probably because of the great increase in divorce and separation
cases as a result of more liberal laws regarding marriage and the
preference in those cases for judge trials. As stated previously, civil jury
trials take considerably longer than trials to a judge; and in addition, all
civil trials take somewhat longer than they did ten years ago. 72 Figures in
New York County show that it now takes about 36% more time to try
accident cases, apparently because of the increased use of expert medical
testimony. 73
Whatever the trend may be in any state, the fact that the majority of
trials in state courts are to a jury underscores the necessity of considering
possible modifications of the jury system to save time and expense in
processing civil business.
Until Williams v. Florida there had never been any question that in the
federal courts the right to jury trial in suits at common law, as guaranteed
by the seventh amendment, meant a jury of twelve. 74 The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provide only that the parties may stipulate that the jury
consist of less than twelve.
75
For some years such stipulations have been suggested to the litigants
by the judge before trial begins. Frequently the stipulation is that a verdict
cases in 1969 was 76% (759 jury trials, 264 nonjury trials), whereas the percentage of jury
trials in other civil actions was only 26% (631 jury trials, 1,793 nonjury trials). Michigan
Annual Report, 1969, supra note 52.
9Massachusetts Annual Reports, supra note 67, 1960-61 and 1968-69 (1960-61-1,601
jury trials, 631 nonjury trials).
7 New Jersey Reports, supra note 52, 1959-60 and 1969-70, Tables D-3 (1959-60-1,832
jury dispositions, 1,310 nonjury dispositions).
7tNew York Annual Reports, supra note 2, 1959-60 and 1969-70, Tables 9 (1959-
60-34,682 jury dispositions, 16,046 nonjury dispositions).
72For example, statistics provided by Leland L. Tolman, Jr., Director of
Administration, First Judicial Department, New York State, on April 23, 1971, show that
the average length of personal injury jury trials in the New York County Supreme Court rose
from 13.78 hours in 1961 to 18.83 hours in 1970.
"Id. The average ihterval from filing to trial in civil jury cases has also greatly
increased. In emichigan, for instance, the average interval rose from twelve months in 1960 to
twenty-nine months in 1970. Michigan Annual Reports, 1960 and 1969, supra note 52.
Similarly, in New York County, the jury delay in personal injury cases rose from twelve
months in 1964 to forty-four months in 1970, and there is a similar trend in most of the other
counties in New York. New York Annual Reports, supra note 2, 1963-64 at 185, and 1969-
70 at 306. In Los Angeles County the interval rose from 25.5 months in 1967 to thirty-four
months in 1970. Annual Report of the Administrative Office of the California Courts for
1969-70 at 117, Table XXVI.
74Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900) (dictum); see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 92 n. 30 (1970); cf. American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897).
7"FED. R. Civ. P. 48.
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may be returned by a jury of ten or eleven, if the court finds it necessary
during trial to excuse one or two jurors. Recently some judges in the
Southern District of New York have secured stipulations from the parties
which provide that the case "may be tried to a jury of six members, and
that a verdict may be rendered when five-sixths of the jurors constituting
the jury have agreed." 76 Experience with such trials has been entirely
satisfactory.
On the other hand, Federal Rule 39 permits the judge in his discretion
fo order trial by jury of any or all of the issues, even where the parties have
not demanded a jury or have no right to a jury.
71
Under the impetus of the Supreme Court's approval of six-man juries
in state felony trials, at least eight federal district courts have recently
provided by rule for trial of civil cases by six-man juries. Following the
lead of the Minnesota district court, the rules in several districts now
provide that all juries in diversity cases, FELA cases and Jones Act suits
will be six-man juries. 78 These categories include a majority of jury trials
in most federal districts.
In some districts, such as the District of Columbia, the new rule is that
all civil trials shall be by juries of six. 79 And in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, the district court, after conferring with the bar,
promulgated a rule, effective May 1, 1971, which provides that unless a
party shall demand 12, civil juries shall be composed of 8 members, with
no alternates, a verdict to be accepted from a jury which may have as few
as six members as a result of incapacity or excuse during trial."
In recent years the Supreme Court has shown some tendency to decide
doubtful cases in favor of jury trial. For example, where legal and
equitable relief is sought from the same operative facts and there is some
doubt as to which are predominant, the Court has held that the case must
7'Rule 48, FED. R. Civ. P. provides:
The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less
than twelve or that a verdict or a finding of a stated majority of the jurors
shall be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury.
"FED. R. Civ. P. 39(b), (c); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 409 (2d ed. 1970).
7 The Minnesota rule became effective January 1, 1971. D. MINN. R. 6 E. The Southern
District of Florida followed suit on March 1, 1971. S.D. FLA. R. __ Effective May 1,
1971, the Northern and Southern Districts of Indiana adopted the Minnesota rule, and
further provided for a jury of six in cases involving condemnation of real and personal
property under the power of eminent domain. S.D. IND. R. 6.1; N.D. IND. R. 6.1.
ID.D.C. R. 18 (effective June 1, 1971) (except in cases of eminent domain). The new
rule for the Southern District of Illinois, which became effective May 1, 197 1, provides for a
jury of six in all cases "except as may be otherwise expressly required by law or controlling
rule." S.D. ILL. R. 18. The District of New Mexico now provides for ajury of six in all civil
jury cases. D.N.M.R. - (effective May 1, 1971).
'OE.D. PA. R. 29/2.
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be tried by a jury."' The Court also held as to a stockholder's suit for
damages, that although there was no such action at common law, the suit
more nearly resembles an action at law, and a jury may be demanded.12
The Judicial Conference of the United States, at its meeting in March
1971, approved in principle a reduction in the size ofjuries in all civil cases
and referred to two of its committees the matter of effecting the change., 3
This action reflects the feeling that by what it said in Williams v. Florida,
the Supreme Court by implication construed the seventh amendment to
permit juries of six in civil cases.
It might be thought that such a change in the federal system could be
initiated by the Judicial Conference under the rule-making power. As you
know, after rules are formulated and the bench and bar have studied the
proposals, the Judicial Conference must approve and then the Supreme
Court, if it approves, sends the rules to Congress. The rules take effect
only after some months, provided of course that meanwhile Congress has
not acted otherwise.8
However, the Enabling Act of 1934, which gave the Supreme Court its
first rule-making authority which resulted in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, specifically provided that in the rules to be drafted, "the right
of trial by jury as at common law and declared by the seventh amendment
to the Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate." 5 This
proviso strongly suggests that Congress may want to determine whether
such a fundamental change should be brought about in federal court
procedure. Congress may prefer to pass upon such a fundamental change
without waiting for the Rules Committee, the Judicial Conference and the
Supreme Court. So far as one may prophesy now, it would appear that the
change to six-man juries in civil jury trials in federal courts would meet
with general acceptance.
A substantial number of states provide for civil jury trials of less than
twelve jurors in some instances. A common provision is for juries of less
8 1Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
12Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
'-The Judicial Conference's resolution provides:
BE IT RESOLVED by the Judicial Conference of the United States that it
adopts the recommendations of the Committee on the Operation of the
Jury System that the Conference approve in principle a reduction in the
size of juries in civil trials in United States district courts, and upon such
reduction that there be a diminution in the peremptory challenges normally
allowed. It is also resolved that the means to effectuate the objectives set
forth in this resolution, i.e., by rulemaking or statute, be referred to the
Committees on the Operation of the Jury System and Civil Rules.
-428 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964); see FED. R. Civ. P. 86.
8 Act of June 19, 1934, c. 651, § 2, 58 Stat. 1064 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1964)).
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than twelve upon consent of the parties."' Many states distinguish between
courts of general jurisdiction on the one hand, and county courts, justice
of the peace courts, and courts not of record on the other. In Arizona, for
example, there are twelve jurors in courts of record, and six jurors in
courts not of record; the parties by consent can provide for a lesser
number in each court. s7 Kentucky, Texas, and Washington, to mention
only a few examples, are similar."" A few provide for a jury of less than
twelve, but allow a party to demand a full twelve-man jury.,9 At least two
states have differing requirements for the size of the jury contingent upon
the amount in controversy. Idaho provides for a jury of twelve unless the
parties agree to fewer if the amount in controversy exceeds $500. For
smaller amounts, there are six or fewer jurors.9 0 Virginia's provision is
unique: for cases involving an amount less than $300, there is a five-man
jury, whereas a jury of seven is provided for cases involving a larger sum in
controversy.9 Unlike most other states described above, then, Virginia
makes no provision for a jury of twelve in any civil cases. Florida follows
Virginia in this regard, providing for a jury of six in all civil cases.9 2 We
can see from this survey that a substantial majority of states have cast
aside the twelve-man jury in at least certain civil cases, and by all accounts
the results have been satisfactory.
9 3
The further modification to provide that the court shall receive less
than unanimous verdicts in civil jury cases, whatever the size of the jury,
"E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 194 (West 1954); MD. R. OF PROC. 544; N.J. R. 4:49-
I; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 270.15(3) (1957).
8
7ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-102 (1956).
''Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29.015 (1963) (twelve jurors in circuit court, or fewer by
consent; six in inferior courts); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2191 (1964) (twelve in district
court, or fewer by consent; six in county court); WASH. REV. CODE § 2.36.050 (1956)
(twelve in superior court; six in justice of the peace court).
31E.g., IOwA CODE ANN. § 603.34 (1950) (six in superior court, unless twelve
demanded); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.24 (Baldwin 1964) (six unless parties agree to a
less number or demand is made for jury of eight or twelve).
"IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2-105 (1948).
"VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; VA. CODE ANN. § 8-193 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
2 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 53.041 (1969). In New York City Civil Court, which generally
speaking has jurisdiction of civil actions wherein the amount in controversy does not exceed
$10,000, N.Y.C. Civ. CT. AcT §§ 201-212 (McKinney 1963), all juries will be composed of
six persons pursuant to recent legislation, which takes effect on September 1', 1971.
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 26, 1971, at I, col. 4. Previously, the Act provided for juries of six, but either
party could demand a jury of twelve in actions to recover possession of real property or of a
chattel, and actions for money damages only, where the amount or value in controversy
exceeded $300. N.Y.C. Civ. CT. AcT § 1305 (McKinney 1963).
"3Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101 (1970); Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A
Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 51 GEo. L.J. 120, 135-37 (1962); Joiner, Jury
Trials -Improved Procedures, 48 F.R.D. 79, 85-86 (paper delivered at First Nat'l
Convention of Defense Attorneys, Center for Continuing Legal Educ., U. of Chicago, Apr.
4-5, 1969).
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would also serve to save court time and greatly reduce the number of hung
juries. As the Supreme Court has not yet decided the constitutionality of
less than unanimous verdicts in criminal cases, it must be said that the
constitutionality of less than unanimous verdicts in federal civil jury trials
may also be in doubt.9" In several states, such verdicts have been used for
many years with desirable results, particularly in reducing the number of
hung juries. For example, Arizona, Kentucky, and Ohio each provides
that in civil actions the verdict may be taken if three-fourths of the jurors
concur;9 5 New York accepts a verdict from five-sixths of the jurors in civil
cases;9" and the Michigan constitution provides that in such cases a verdict
shall be received when ten of twelve jurors agree. 7 In addition, Delaware,
Maryland, and New Jersey provide that the parties may stipulate that a
verdict of a stated majority of the jurors shall be taken as the verdict of the
jury.
98
As to the constitutionality of such verdicts, the Supreme Court in 1916
upheld the constitutionality of a five-sixths verdict in a state civil case,
stating expressly that the seventh amendment applies only to the federal
courts;9" and this Term the Supreme Court dismissed, for want of a
substantial federal question, an appeal from Louisiana involving the issue
whether the seventh amendment applies to the states. 11 In any event, the
satisfactory experience with fractional verdicts in state civil cases is strong
support for the proposition that they comply with the due process
provision of the fourteenth amendment.
There are some who think that we should abolish jury trials in all civil
cases. The New Jersey supreme court has recently called on the Governor
and the state legislature to consider amendments to the New Jersey
constitution which would either reduce the number of jurors required or
eliminate altogether the right to jury trial in civil cases.'"'
In England, trial by jury in civil cases has become very rare, by reason
of acts of Parliament in 1933 and 1934 which limited jury trials to cases of
"In 1897, the Supreme Court ruled that the seventh amendment requires a unanimous
verdict. American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897).95ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 21-102 (1956); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29.015 (1963);
OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 5, implemented by OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.24 (Baldwin
1964).
"N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2, implemented by N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW R. 4113 (McKinney
1963).
7MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 14.
"DEL. SUPER. CT. (Civ.) R. 48; MD. R. OF PROC. 544; N.J. R. 4:49-1 and RUtLES
GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 1:8-2.
9 Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (FELA action in
state court).
'"Berry v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. 1313, cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3433
(U.S. Apr. 6, 1971).
'Memorandum of Edward B. McConnell, supra note 43.
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libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction or
breach of promise, or where the court orders a jury.0 2 Thus during a
recent three-year period only 4% of the trials at Queens Bench in London
were to a jury, and outside of London at the Assizes less than one in every
200 trials was to a jury.
0 3
Despite the saving in time and expense, I doubt that total abolition of
juries in civil cases can win substantial support in this country. First, I do
not believe that claimants in accident cases would be content to have
liability and damages assessed by a judge; and certainly much of our trial
bar would be opposed to it. When we find some different and better way of
handling automobile accident claims than by jury trial, most of our
problems of crowded calendars and jury trials will be solved. Such a
drastic change as abolition of jury trial can only come about gradually, as
it did in England following long experience prior to 1917 and the abolition
of jury trial as a war measure during World War 1.104 Moreover, the
independence of the English judges and their total freedom from political
pressures cannot be matched in any American jurisdiction. By the same
token the availability of a jury is looked upon by many litigants as a more
evenhanded method of deciding facts than leaving such a decision to one
man whose impartiality and susceptibility to political or other pressures
may, in some communities where judges are elected for short terms, be
open to question. I believe there is considerable merit to this point of view.
Moreover, a judge may himself prefer to have a jury decide factual issues
in certain kinds of cases.
Finally, there is the important question whether abolition of jury trial
in civil cases would be constitutional. It is clear that in federal courts the
seventh amendment would preclude abolition. But if a state decided to do
away with jury trials in civil cases, it is not so clear that that provision
would be struck down as violative of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Indeed, in several cases decided before the advent
of the incorporation theories, the Supreme Court stated that the denial by
a state of trial by jury is not inconsistent with due process.10 5 Of course,
under the total incorporation doctrine, which would make the seventh
amendment guarantee an integral part of due process, approval of
abolition by a state would be very doubtful. But if the view expressed by
Justices Harlan and Stewart in Williams v. Florida,06 should prevail, or if
11R. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 72 (1967).
11ld. at 73, Table IV.
111Id. at 72-73.
"'Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931); New
York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 208 (1917); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 340
(1915); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875). See also Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (seventh amendment inapplicable to the states); see note
99 supra and accompanying text.
'"399 U.S. at 117 (Harlan, J., concurring) and at 143 (Stewart, J. concurring).
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selective incorporation is not extended to the seventh amendment, and the
Court thus adheres to its prior decisions, then abolition of jury trial in
civil cases might well be found to conform to due process. The Court's
dismissal this Term of the Louisiana case involving the applicability of the
seventh amendment to the states'07 may indicate that the latter is more
likely.
Any study of the jury system, as it operates today in the courts of this
country, is seriously handicapped by the inadequate reports and statistics,
except those of the federal courts. None of the states assembles and
publishes information in sufficient detail regarding the classes of cases and
the variety of situations involved so that any conclusion can be drawn as
to what procedural measures or substantive changes might accomplish in
the saving of court time and expense. The total cost of operating the jury
system in any state fully justifies the relatively small expense of keeping
the kind of records necessary for better administration and planning. In
the federal system jurors' fees and expenses alone now exceed $14,000,000
per year. 18
From this cursory study of the operation of our jury system I suggest
the following conclusions:
I. By statute, or by court rule, or, where necessary, by constitutional
amendment, six-man juries should be authorized in the trial of all civil
cases and in all criminal cases, except capital crimes. I would not abolish
jury trial in civil cases but would leave it to the legislature to require the
party demanding a jury to pay for the cost of trial by jury, if he can afford
it. This would tend to eliminate the use of juries in many cases.
2. In civil cases verdicts should be received when five jurors out of six
are agreed.
3. Waiver of jury trial should be permitted in all civil and criminal
cases. In criminal cases, the government's consent to waiver should be
required, and the approval of the court.
4. In addition, most small claims up to $500 should be tried without
a jury," 9 and petty offenses where the punishment does not exceed
imprisonment for six months and fine of $500 should be tried without a
jury.
5. In any civil or criminal case the court should have the power, on
its own motion, to have the issues tried to a jury.
6. Court rules should provide that the. examination of jurors be
conducted by the court, and the court should be given broad powers to
empanel any number of alternate jurors and use as many as may be
needed up to the time of verdict.
'*Note 100 supra and accompanying text.
O'sSee ARAOUSC, 1970, at 111-4.
'"Perhaps the option of demanding a jury trial should be preserved in landlord-tenant
disputes, consumer credit cases, and the like.
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7. The bench and bar in each state and metropolitan center should
study means whereby jury trials may be shortened.
8. Appellate courts should allow trial judges wide discretion in their
control of the courtroom, the examination and selection of jurors and all
reasonable means in assisting the jurors to arrive at a verdict. In light of
the generally high quality of performance by juries, appellate courts
reviewing judgments rendered in cases tried to a jury should not lightly
assume that minor errors committed at the trial had a prejudicial impact
on the jurors.
9. Jurors and counsel should be instructed that jury discussions are
to be kept secret and no disclosure is to be made unless the court, by
written order, permits this to be done for good cause. Any disobedience of
such court instructions would be treated as contempt of court.
With the jury system modified as suggested, I believe that the time
now taken in the use of juries can be materially reduced-perhaps by as
much as one-half. This much time saved would be a mighty spur toward
more speedy justice. I believe all this can be done without any loss in the
quality of jury determinations. In our concern about mounting delays and
escalating costs, we must always keep in mind that no system of justice
can win that public support and respect without which it cannot continue
to function, unless it allows to all litigants the time and the means to have
their side of any litigated matter fully and fairly heard and determined.
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